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The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a feasibility-
analysis of using Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria
(C/SCSC, also called "Earned Value") management techniques at
U.S. Army Depots. C/SCSC compliance is normally used by the
defense industry when contracting with the U.S. Government for
large Research & Development (R&D) projects. However, program
managers of acquisition programs that require significant work
at Army depots may also need methods for tracking cost and
schedule. One method may be the implementation of C/SCSC
management techniques at these depots. This thesis provides
a comparative analysis of earned value techniques and depot
reporting systems.
B . BACKGROUND
In view of declining U.S. Defense budgets, Army acquisi-
tion program offices are more concerned than ever that program
funds are spent effectively and efficiently with industry and
other Government field activities, including test centers,
depots, arsenals and research laboratories. Increased efforts
are being put forth by program offices to ensure that both
industry and Government field activities employ effective cost
and schedule control systems when using program funds in
support of their programs
.
Nearly 25 years ago, the Department of Defense adopted
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) for
significant contracts and subcontracts (excluding fixed price
contracts) within all acquisition programs. Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.2 (part 11, section B) also states
that these criteria will be applied to significant work
efforts accomplished by Government activities when meeting the
same or similar dollar thresholds. However, with the excep-
tion of a few isolated cases, this concept has not been used
by Government field activities.
The Program Manager of the Army Data Distribution System
(ADDS) , whose program is spending significant amounts of
program funds with both industry and Government field activi-
ties, was concerned about the field activities' cost/schedule
management. The ADDS program has several contracts with
industry that use the earned value concept, but the work
efforts, or "contracts," with Government activities did not.
The ADDS program currently has significant work efforts at the
following Government field activities:
• Sacramento Army Depot
• Tobyhanna Army Depot
• Marine Corps Tactical Software Support Activity
• Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachucha
• Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM)
The concern of the ADDS Program Manager provided the basis for
this thesis.
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to provide future program
managers insight and background information on the earned
value concept and its feasibility for use within U.S. Army-
depots. It examines the cost/schedule management problem con-
fronted by program managers whose programs may involve
significant acquisition support from depots. It will enable
individuals in program offices to understand the importance of
the earned value concept in managing program cost and sched-
ule. This analysis should benefit program managers when
having to decide whether to require depots to comply with
C/SCSC or to allow the depot to use its standard reporting
systems
.
A major product of the earned value concept, the
Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) , is also examined in this
thesis. The C/SSR was designed for smaller, non-major
acquisition programs in an effort to minimize the many
"program unique" reports.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is:
"Should the earned value concept be incorporated at U.S.
Army Depots?"
Subsidiary research questions are:
• What is the earned value concept and how is it used?
• What key characteristics of earned value are essential for
its application?
• What significant acquisition efforts performed by Army
depots lend themselves to the use of the earned value
concept?
• To what extent is earned value currently being used by
Army depots?
• What factors must be addressed before earned value can be
implemented at Army depots?
• To what extent can earned value be applied to Army depots?
• What is the value of applying the earned value concept to
Army depots performing significant acquisition efforts?
E . SCOPE
This thesis will assess the utility of employing the
earned value concept in US Army depots only. It will focus on
three depots in particular - Sacramento, Letterkenny and
Tobyhanna Army depots . Two current Army programs , the Army
Data Distribution System (ADDS) , and the Firefinder Radar
program, will be assessed as examples for cost and schedule
management by the depots supporting these programs.
This thesis will focus on the use of the C/SSR, since most
work efforts accepted by depots do not require the use of the
Cost Performance Report (CPR) . The threshold for the C/SSR is
normally set for contracts valued over $2 million and for a
duration of 12 months or more, which is the range of many
depot work efforts for Army acquisition program offices. The
CPR is a more detailed report using the earned value concept.
It is required when contracts are valued at $60 million or
more in research, development, test and evaluation and $250
million or more in procurement (in 1990 constant dollars)
[Ref
. 7:p. ll-B-2] . However, it is not likely that any depot
will be assigned a single work effort valued over the
thresholds for the CPR.
P . METHODOLOGY
Research for this thesis consisted primarily of an indepth
literature review and interviews with key personnel involved
with cost and schedule management. This thesis utilized the
guidelines set forth in the Cost/Schedule Status Report Joint
Guide , which provides Department of Defense instructions for
cost/schedule management for non-major acquisitions. In addi-
tion, Government reports, instructions, directives, textbooks,
theses and periodicals were used for information sources. The
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and the
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) provided other
sources of information. A thorough review of operating proce-
dures and on-site visits of the three depots provided valuable
information on their current cost/schedule management
techniques
.
Most of the information on depot operations and reporting,
however, came from interviews with key personnel within the
three depots. The personnel interviewed are all involved with
cost, schedule and production management of various acquisi-
tion programs. Interviews also included numerous people from
acquisition program offices, the Depot Systems Command
Headquarters (DESCOM) and several members of private industry.
Information on the use of earned value in private industry
came from interviews with personnel from Hughes Aircraft, of
Fullerton, California. Hughes is the prime contractor for the
ADDS program and has recently been validated for C/SCSC after
approximately five years of review and examination by Govern-
ment program office personnel.
In addition, in April of 1992, the researcher attended a
National C/SCSC Workshop in San Francisco, California. This
forum furnished vital insights into the widespread use of
C/SCSC and the earned value concept . The workshop was
attended by professionals from the DOD staff, the Performance
Management Association, defense industry, the National
Security Industrial Association, the Department of Energy, the
Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis, and the military
services
.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE EARNED VALUE CONCEPT
A. HISTORY/BACKGROUND
Earned value is just one of several concepts embodied in
the Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) , but it is
the one concept that many consider to be fundamental to
performance measurement
. Earned value is the value of the
work accomplished as measured in terms of the budget planned
(a baseline of scheduled work) for that work. A complete
description of earned value, however, cannot be given without
a brief background of the concept and C/SCSC.
In the late 1950s, Government program managers were at-
tempting to reverse the trend of large budget and schedule
overruns of major acquisition programs. Often, these overruns
were unpredictable and not identified until near contract
completion. Two network scheduling concepts emerged during
this time, which originated in the defense community, and were
implemented by the Government: PERT (program evaluation and
review technique) and CPM (critical path method) . PERT was
developed by the Navy and the management consulting firm Booz,
Allen and Hamilton --to support the planning of the Polaris
Missile project. Meanwhile, J.E. Kelly of Remington Rand and
M.R. Walker of Dupont introduced the CPM.
Both had a similar approach of linking together the
planned events and tasks in an attempt to show the relation-
ships and constraints between them, but differed in their
treatment of time and cost. PERT used stochastic or probabil-
istic network models, while CPM used deterministic network
models. Thus, PERT was designed to handle the uncertainties
that exist in predicting the time necessary to complete
various project activities. CPM, which uses single value best
estimates of both time and costs, was concerned more with the
time/cost tradeoff, that is, the tradeoff between project
completion date and project cost [Ref . 30:p. 383]. These
networking concepts initially received high acclaim and in the
early 1960s, the Government attempted to apply PERT/CPM to all
major contracts.
Eventually, resources were added to the PERT scheduling
technique, and thus it became known as PERT/Cost. The
PERT/Cost method was a very important phase of the evolution
of cost and schedule management because it suggested the idea
of planning and scheduling program work with periodic
performance measurements. It also provided the capability to
estimate project completion times and costs. This new concept
was called "Earned Value Management," [Ref. 14:p. 23].
However, the defense industry basically ignored the tech-
nique because of poor implementation by the Government and the
lack of supporting automation equipment. The Department of
Defense "proclaimed" Pert/Cost to be the single management
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technique to be used on all major defense contracts.
Experienced industry officials and military officers naturally
resented being told what management technique to use on their
contracts, and thus PERT/Cost quietly faded.
In 1963, the United States Air Force formed the
Cost/Schedule Planning & Control Specifications group, which
conceived the idea that a contractor's existing management
control system should satisfy a certain set of "criteria,
"
rather than requiring implementation of a new system. The Air
Force Minuteman missile program included this set of
management criteria in the contract statement of work and
pioneered the implementation of the criteria approach as a
realistic appraisal of a contractor's internal management
control systems [Ref. ll:p. 14]. This approach included
several improvements and carried over the work breakdown
structure and work packages ideas from PERT/Cost. It was
designated as the Earned Value Concept and referred to the
work actually accomplished as measured in terms of the
baseline budget planned for that work [Ref. ll:p. 14], The
resulting set of standards or criteria, called Cost/Schedule
and Control Specification (C-Spec) was officially adopted by
the Air Force Systems Command in June 1966.
In December 19 67, the Department of Defense issued DOD
Instruction 7000.2, Performance Measurement for Selected
Acquisitions . Henceforth, DOD standardized the requirements
with a set of 35 criteria that a contractor's management
information system would have to meet. Even with this policy
requirement in place, the C/SCSC approach had a slow start
because there were no formal guidelines that explained the
earned value concept and how it could be consistently applied.
Therefore, a Tri- Service C/SCSC Joint Implementation Guide was
issued in 1970, and by 1972 all three Services were actively
implementing C/SCSC [Ref . 11 :p. 14] .
The implementation guide has been updated several times
since then, but the criteria remain the same today. Thus what
started in one Air Force project has spread to the Army and
the Navy, to other Federal agencies, including NASA, the
Departments of Energy and Transportation and even to the
Australian Department of Defense.
1. The C/SCSC Criteria
As stated earlier, only the implementation of C/SCSC
has been changed or improved while the criteria have remained
unchanged in 25 years. The C/SCSC contain 35 criteria that
can be grouped into five categories. These categories
generally deal with the following requirements [Ref. 31 :p.
17] :
a . Organiza tion
These criteria require that the contractor's system
provide for clear definition of the overall contractual effort
with a work breakdown structure serving as a framework for
displaying subdivisions of effort. Integration of the work
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breakdown structure with the functional organization structure
is required in order to provide for identification of key
positions and assignment of responsibility for work tasks.
Additionally, integration of the planning, scheduling,
budgeting, work authorizing and cost accumulation subsystems
is a key element in an effective control system.
Jb. Planning and Budgeting
All authorized work must be planned and scheduled
in a manner that describes the sequence of work and identifies
the significant task interdependencies required to meet the
development, production, and delivery requirements of the
contract. Establishment of the performance measurement
baseline is the key requirement of this section.
c. Accounting
Cost of completed work must be accumulated from the
bottom up as directly as possible without need for allocations
in summation. Cost of materials should be handled on an
applied cost basis, if possible, in order that the cost of
work does not include cost of materials on order or in
inventory. The accounting system should provide for accurate
cost accumulation and assignment of costs to cost accounts in
a manner consistent with the budgets using recognized,
acceptable costing techniques and allows for comparison with
the baseline. Direct costs should be summarized from cost
accounts into the work breakdown structure without allocation
11
of a single cost account to two or more work breakdown
structure elements. All indirect costs attributable to the
contract must be recorded and allocated. If applicable, the
accounting system must be able to identify unit cost,
equivalent unit costs, or lot costs.
d. Analysis
Actual versus planned performance comparisons are
required by this group of criteria. Comparing the budgeted
cost of work scheduled and the budgeted cost of work performed
on a monthly basis allows for the analysis of variances from
the baseline. Thresholds for variance analyses should be
established to avoid excess effort which may otherwise result
from analyzing every single variance. It is important that
variances be examined in terms of increments or aggregations
of work which are large enough to produce significant
information. Analyzing individual work packages would not be
cost effective. Based on performance to date, on commitment
values for materials, and on estimates of future conditions,
the analysis should provide for revised estimates of cost at
completion for work breakdown structure elements identified in
the contract. This estimate can be compared to the contract




e. Revisions and Access to Data
Incorporation of authorized changes are dealt with
in this set of criteria. Emphasis is placed on the need to
retain a meaningful performance measurement baseline.
Requirements include reconciliation of estimated costs at
completion with fund requirements reports and original budgets
for those elements of the work breakdown structure.
Provisions must be in place for access to data by Government
personnel for evaluations of criteria compliance.
The Department of Defense recognized that there is no
single set of management control systems that will meet every
need for performance measurement. The criteria approach,
however, provides a basis for determining whether the
management control systems of a contractor are acceptable. A
full listing of the 35 criteria is presented in Appendix A.
2. Thresholds for Compliance
In 1991, the DOD consolidated most of the acquisition
policies and procedures of the DODI 7000 series into DODI
5000.2. Part 11 of DODI 5000.2 describes C/SCSC and the
thresholds of contract values for mandatory compliance with
the criteria. It states that compliance with C/SCSC shall be
required on significant contracts and subcontracts within all
acquisition programs, unless waived by the milestone decision
authority [Ref. 7:p. ll-B-2] . Significant contracts are
defined as:
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Research, development, test, and evaluation contracts
valued at $60 million or more; or procurement contracts
with a value of $250 million or more (in fiscal year 1990
constant dollars)
.
Part 11 -B further states that compliance with C/SCSC
shall also be required for "significant acquisition efforts"
performed by Government field activities for program offices.
However, the instruction provides no thresholds nor a
definition of "Government performed significant acquisition
efforts". A representative of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) explained that the
instruction was written as such to give the Government
program manager the flexibility to determine if C/SCSC should
be used in Government field activities supporting his program.
In addition, DODI 5000.2, part 11-B states that
compliance with C/SCSC shall not be required on firm fixed-
price contracts, time and material contracts, and level- of
-
effort contracts, unless exception is made by the milestone
decision authority. The original purpose of the earned value
concept was to monitor and control costs, which obviously
protected the buyer when the buyer was sharing the risks with
the contractor. With a fixed-price contract, more of the risk
is shifted from the buyer to the contractor, so the safe-
guards and the predictive tools of earned value are not
necessary in this regard. The final price is guaranteed up
front with a fixed-price contract, so any overruns are borne
by the contractor.
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B. OBJECTIVES OF THE EARNED VALUE CONCEPT
Government program managers have an inherent duty to
ensure that program resources are spent efficiently and
economically mainly because their efforts are funded by
taxpayers' monies. When contracting with private industry for
goods and services, program managers have to have accurate and
reliable performance measurement data to do this. Before
C/SCSC, there were no methods to objectively assess program
performance, either before or after work was started. Rather
than imposing management control systems onto contractors, the
criteria concept merely specifies the minimum requirements
that a contractor's control system must satisfy. It has to
allow for the verification of work performed, and to generate
reliable and measurable projections of the total contract
cost.
Two formal objectives of the criteria approach, as
restated in Arthor D. Little's C/SCSC White Paper , in 1986
[Ref. 17:p. 1] are:
• For contractors to use effective internal cost and
schedule management control systems, and
• For the Government to be able to rely on timely and
auditable data produced by those systems for determining
product -oriented contract status.
Contractors are still able to organize their work and
control systems in the manner best suited to their individual
environments and may establish and operate to the internal
methods of their choice. It is important to note that the
15
criteria themselves do not require the submission of any
reports, but only specify the reporting capabilities the
contractors must have and the types of data that the systems
should be able to produce. The type and detail of reports are
selected by the Government program office, depending on dollar
value of the contract and other requirements
.
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, part 11-B states
that the purpose of C/SCSC is to provide contractor and
Government program managers with accurate data to monitor
execution of their program [Ref. 7:p. ll-B-1] and to:
• Preclude the imposition of specific cost and schedule
control systems.
• Provide adequate basis for responsible decision making by
both contractor management and DOD component personnel by
requiring the contractors' internal management control
systems to produce data that:
Indicate work progress
.
Properly relate cost, schedule, and
technical accomplishment.
Are valid, timely, and able to be
audited.
Provide DOD component managers with
information at a practical level of
summarization.
• Bring to the attention of DOD contractors, and encourage
them to accept and install, management control systems and
procedures that are most effective in meeting requirements
and controlling contract performance.
C. KEY ASPECTS OF THE EARNED VALUE CONCEPT
One of the primary purposes of using the earned value
concept is to provide advance indications of potential and
16
actual program problems before they become significant. In
addition to the advance indication of problems, earned value
measurements can also identify specific problem areas, down to
the work center level. However, in order to obtain the
benefits of earned value measurements, three key items of a
management control system are essential for its use:
• Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
• Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB)
• Consistent Earned Value Measurement Techniques.
1. Work Breakdown Structure
The WBS is a method which defines the total work of a
program or contract into manageable work packages. MIL-STD-
881A is the DOD document that provides preparation
instructions and DOD Directive 5010.21 is the implementing
directive for its use. The military standard defines a work
breakdown structure as:
A product oriented family tree composed of hardware,
services and data which result from project engineering
efforts during the development and production of a defense
material item, and which completely defines the
project/program. A WBS displays and defines the
product (s) and relates the elements of work to be
accomplished to each other and to the end product.
If a WBS is displayed on a wall, it can resemble an
organizational chart, graphically describing a given
contract's statement of work, specifically calling out the
hardware, software, and services to be performed [Ref. 12 :p.
28] . It starts out with a single box, into which everything
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below will flow. The top box represents the total system and
is called WBS level 1. Lower levels are appropriately-
numbered 2, 3, and so on (see Figure 1) . Levels 1-3 are
normally referred to as Project WBS and levels 3-5 are called
the Contractor WBS. Most contracts will call for reporting
cost/schedule data in detail down to level 3, although actual
cost collecting comes from all WBS levels.
The WBS technique is important to both the buyer and
contractor for several reasons. One is that a standardized
WBS reporting format allows the buyer to compare proposals for
new efforts and estimates to complete an existing job against
actuals for work already accomplished for effort at the same
WBS level . A second reason is that it helps the contractor
plan new projects and demonstrate to the Government the
contractor's knowledge about the proposed new job. Finally,
it is important because it aids in the definition of the work
to be done in total, and it allows the contractor to break the
total effort down into manageable work teams for purposes of
specific procurement packages.
In order to assign functional responsibility for the
tasks to be performed, integration of the organizational
structure with the work breakdown structure is necessary. A
matrix arrangement is the most common technique used by
contractors to accomplish this integration effectively. As a
result, the intersection of these two structures is often
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Figure 1. Organizational Chart WBS [Ref. 34].
costs and other information before summarizing for higher
levels of management. This intersection point establishes
what is often called the cost account or cost control account.
The cost account is normally the lowest level where
performance measurement is managed based on costs information
obtained from work packages.
2. Performance Measurement Baseline
Once a WBS is established, the next step is to
schedule the work and allocate program resources to each task
to a baseline. This "baseline management," is the beginning
19
of earned value measurement. This is critical in assessing
performance, in that one must know what to measure against in
specific terms on a periodic (monthly) basis. Baseline
management includes the establishment of a baseline,
maintaining it and monitoring performance (variances from the
baseline), which is called performance measurement. Figure 2
graphically presents the three- step iterative process of the
performance measurement baseline [Ref. 14:p. 97].
CONTRACT BUDGET BASE
MOT RES




A 3 Step Iterative Process
One of the most important measurements derived from
the PMB is the estimate at completion (EAC) , which is the
bottom line, i.e., what the project will likely cost when it's
completed [Ref. 14:p. 93]. For this to be reliable, however,
both the scheduling and the budgeting systems must be formal
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and disciplined to prevent arbitrary changes. Most projects
have nearly continuous changes in the baseline but they must
be controlled and result only from deliberate management
actions. Therefore, it is essential to establish a PMB that
defines a budget baseline for the original work, before the
changes to the original work occur. This will allow the means
to incorporate changes and keep revisions up to date.
Once the initial PMB is established to a degree where
earned value measurement and customer reporting can begin,
monitoring the variances is the critical next step. With the
earned value concept, performance variances cause attention to
be focused only on those areas or work packages that have
exceeded reasonable, previously set limitations. These limits
are called variance thresholds and cover both cost and
schedule performance.
3. Consistent Earned Value Measurements
Some important terms must be defined before a
description of the various earned value measuring techniques
can be given.
BCWS - Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled. This is the time-
phased sum of the budgets of all work packages scheduled to be
accomplished. This is equivalent to the PMB (performance
measurement baseline)
.
BCWP - Budgeted Cost of Work Performed. This is the sum
of the budgets of completed work packages and completed
portions of open work packages, plus the amount of level of
effort and apportioned effort scheduled to be accomplished in
a given period of time. BCWP is also called Earned Value.
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ACWP - Actual Cost of Work Performed. The sum of costs
actually incurred and recorded in accomplishing work performed
in a given period. ACWP includes direct and indirect costs.
BAC - Budget at Completion. The total sum of all budgets
(BCWS) allocated to a contract, BAC is the end point of the
performance measurement baseline.
EAC - Estimate at completion. A value (expressed in
dollars or hours) that represents a realistic appraisal of the
final cost of tasks when accomplished. It is the sum of all
direct and indirect costs incurred to date plus the estimate
of costs for all remaining work. EAC = Cumulative actuals
(ACWP) + estimate to completion.
ETC - Estimate to completion. This is the BAC minus the
sum of BCWP.
Consistent with the criteria approach, Government
documents on C/SCSC do not prescribe "how" a contractor must
measure performance or earned value. This is left up to the
contractor and usually depends on the type of contract and the
product or service to be delivered. There are just three
rules or guidelines which apply to the calculation of earned
value [Ref. 14 :p. 119]:
• Performance measurements must take place at the lowest
possible level, normally at the cost account level.
Exceptions may be allowed.
• The calculation of earned value (BCWP) must be done using
methods consistent with the way the plan (BCWS) was
established originally, and in the manner in which the
cost actuals (ACWP) are being accumulated.
• Once the BCWP is determined and reported to management and
the Government, no retroactive changes may take place,
except for the adjustment of legitimate accounting errors.
Techniques to measure the BCWP vary from contractor to
contractor, and usually depend on the type of work involved in
the contract and whatever is best suited for the firm. The
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six most common methods, as described in Fleming's Guide, are
described below.
• The 50/50 Technique. This can be used for work packages
with a duration of no more than three accounting periods,
preferably two maximum. Fifty percent of the planned
value is earned when the activity starts, and the balance
is earned when the effort is completed. This can also be
modified to allow the percentages to vary - 25/75 or
40/60, etc. This technique was popular in the early days
of C/SCSC, but its use has diminished in recent times.
• The 0/100 Technique. This approach is best applied to
work packages that are scheduled to start and complete
within one accounting period. Nothing is earned when the
activity starts, but 100 percent is earned when it is
completed.
• Milestone Technique. This approach works best when work
packages will extend past three accounting periods.
Objective milestones are established within a work
package, and the assigned budget for the work package is
divided up based on a weighted value assigned to each
milestone. In those instances where there are no
milestones in a given month, an estimate of the value of
the work completed during the month may by allowed, as
long as the original plan called for such estimates to be
made.
• Percent Complete Technique. This approach allows for a
periodic estimate of the percentage of work completed.
This is done on a cumulative basis by the cost account
manager. For example, if you are making 10 trailers and
you have completed the frames for eight of them, and each
frame is worth 10 percent of the value of a trailer, then
you have an earned value of 80 percent of one trailer (8
X 10% = 80%)
.
• Equivalent and/or Completed Unit Technique. This method
places a given value on each unit completed, or fractional
equivalent unit completed. For example: a value of $25
per unit is assigned as the basis for setting both the
budget value and earned value. If, in a certain month for
a work center, the planned work is to complete 6 units,
the BCWS is then $150 (6 X $25) . If all six units are
completed in that month, then the work center has earned
$150 of earned value (BCWP) . This approach works best
when you have recurring effort (fabrication or assembly)
and the effort will be performed in excess of two
accounting periods.
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• Earned Standards Technique. This method requires the
establishment of standards for the performance of the
tasks to be worked. Historical cost data, time and motion
studies, etc., are all essential to the process of setting
work standards. This technique is best used with
repetitive type manufacturing work.
The current earned value position (BCWP) for a given
contract, regardless of which technique is used, is simply the
summation of all cost accounts which are completed or in-
process, expressed in either dollars or hours. A simple
determination of the estimate to completion (ETC) can be made
by subtracting the BCWP from the total scheduled work or BAC.
Then, if you add the ETC to the actual costs of work performed
(ACWP) to date, you will have the contract's estimated costs
at completion (EAC) . However, this does not consider
cost/schedule variances to date, which are needed for a more
realistic trend analysis.
The EAC and trend analysis for decision making is what
makes the earned value concept so useful, because it can be
generated right from the start of work and continue throughout
the contract period. The importance of this was reinforced by
the current Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) , Mr.
Donald Yockey, who advocates the use of earned value
procedures as an essential part of any PM early warning system
[Ref . 29:p. 15]
.
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D. EARNED VALUE REPORTING
The information generated from earned value calculations
is normally reported to the customer on a monthly basis in one
of two report formats - the Cost Performance Report (CPR) or
the Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) , depending on the
contract value.
1. Cost Performance Report
The CPR is required for all major contracts defined by
DODI 5000.2, part 11-B, as being significant. This monthly
report displays baseline data for both cumulative and current
period costs incurred. It includes cost and schedule
variances, EAC, the Latest Revised Estimate (LRE) , and the
Management Reserve (MR) . The CPR is used by the Government
and contractor to monitor and assess cost/schedule status of
a given program and provides a continuing forecast of the
ultimate estimate of costs at completion compared to that
originally budgeted.
2 . Cost/Schedule Status Report
This report applies to contracts or work efforts that
are not of sufficient dollar value to warrant a CPR. However,
the contractor must be in a position to describe the baseline
and many of the same items covered in C/SCSC. Because of
this, the C/SSR is a less comprehensive and more flexible
management report, which is more appropriate for smaller
acquisitions. For example, the C/SSR does not require
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performance reporting on a functional basis nor manloading
projections. Only cumulative performance is reported in the
C/SSR, rather than both current -period and cumulative
performance, as the CPR requires. The most important
difference between the CPR and the C/SSR is the calculations
of the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) and the Budgeted
Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) . For CPR reporting, the BCWS
and BCWP must be the result of direction summation of work
package budgets. The C/SSR provides for the determination of
these values through means other than work packages [Ref.
34:p. 7]. The specific methodology to be used is normally
negotiated and should be accurately and consistently applied.
Thus, the C/SSR gives the contractor greater flexibility of
using internal performance measurement techniques than does
the CPR.
The C/SSR was established in 1974 to fill a management
void for smaller programs not requiring compliance with C/SCSC
by providing compatible cost and schedule performance data
with that generated on significant contracts. The report's
intent is to provide a summary level cost/schedule performance
data that will satisfy the PM' s information needs from the
same data base employed by the contractor for internal control
purposes. Other objectives of the C/SSR are to:
• Improve management of small programs.
• Avoid management overkill on small programs (or on less-
than- significant contracts of large programs)
.
26
• Avoid proliferation of "program unique" reports.
• Provide objective, integrated, and standardized
cost/schedule performance reporting on contracts.
Generally, the C/SSR applies to contracts that: are
over $2 million; over 12 months in duration; are not selected
for CPR reporting; do not require C/SCSC compliance, and are
not firm fixed-price contracts. Reporting of costs is
normally at WBS level 3, but contractors must be able to
report at a lower level if variance parameters are exceeded.
As stated earlier, the earned value concept enables
the contractor to provide reliable estimates of cost and
schedule at completion. The C/SSR provides monthly updates of
this estimate based on performance trends and the latest
forecast of future conditions. Since the Budget at completion
(BAC) for the contract is the sum of all planned work along
the contract budget baseline (PMB) , the difference between the
EAC and the BAC is the project overrun or underrun for the
contract. Figure 3 presents a graphical example of the















Figure 3. Performance data required and relationships for the
EAC (Estimate at Completion) calculations [Ref. 31].
28
III. THE U.S. ARMY DEPOT SYSTEM
A. HISTORY/BACKGROUND
The US Army Depot System Command (DESCOM) , with
headquarters at Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania, is a major subordinate command (MSC) of the US
Army Materiel Command (AMC) . Established in 1976, DESCOM
commands and controls the Army's 11 depots and five depot
activities. Most of the depots have their origins dating back
to the 1940s, during the height of World War II.
The depots and depot activities are:
• Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama
• Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas
• Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania
• Savanna Depot Activity, Savanna, Illinois
• Lexington- Blue Grass Army Depot, Lexington, Kentucky (due
to close under the Base Realignment & Closure Act
(BRAC) of 1991)
• Mainz Army Depot, Mainz, Germany (closes under BRAC Act)
• Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas
• Sacramento Army Depot, Sacramento, California (closes
under BRAC)
• Seneca Army Depot, Romulus, New York
• Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, California
• Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania
• Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, Utah
• Fort Wingate Depot Activity, Gallop, New Mexico
• Navajo Depot Activity, Flagstaff, Arizona
• Pueblo Depot Activity, Pueblo, Colorado
• Umatilla Army Depot Activity, Hermiston, Oregon
DESCOM employs approximately 28,000 military and civilians
and manages an operating budget of about $2.3 billion
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annually. The primary mission of the depots of DESCOM is to
provide the maintenance, overhaul, and repair of all major
Army systems, including tanks, howitzers, aircraft, combat and
support vehicles, missiles, ammunition, and communication
equipment. The mission also involves the modification,
conversion, storage, and distribution of systems and
equipments.
A recent addition to the mission of depots is that they
are now allowed to manufacture/fabricate complete end items or
systems in support of certain Army acquisition programs. This
addition came about from a change to the Arsenal Act, which
was included in the FY 1992 Appropriation Act. Essentially,
this change provides for depots to perform as subcontractors
to prime defense contractors, and also allows them to
competitively bid for development and production- type
contracts directly from Army acquisition program management
offices. Before the Arsenal Act was changed, depots and
arsenals were prohibited from manufacturing complete systems
and thus competing with the industrial base, basically because
the Government was not "in business to be a business."
However, depots competing for contracts or performing as
subcontractors still have to operate at cost only, or a "zero-
profit" goal when awarded any contracts 1 .
"•Technically, depots are not awarded "contracts" from other
Government activities, but a Interdepartmental Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) is signed by the parties involved. The MOA
provides authority to expend funds and to commence work.
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In response to this new workload source, depots have
formed "strategic business offices," led by a Competition
Manager. The Competition Manager has the responsibility to
monitor the Commerce Business Daily publication and other
sources for Government solicitations that they could
potentially bid for. They also assist in bid preparations and
negotiations
.
In addition to the Arsenal Act change, a DOD directive in
1991 has ordered that the Army Major Subordinate Commands
(MSC) must now compete a portion of their maintenance workload
with private industry. Before this directive, most of the
Army's sustainment overhaul work2 automatically went to the
depot system. The customers reimburse the depots the cost of
the overhaul and maintenance work. For FY 1993, the MSCs, the
primary customers of depots, have estimated that $73 million
worth of overhaul work will be competed between industry and
Army depots. The procedures for this were published in May
1992 in the Joint Service Procedures for Public/Private or
Public/Public Competition of Depot Maintenance [Ref. 32].
2The life cycle of a system or piece of equipment has certain
phases of effort, beginning with: 1. Research & Development, 2.
Manufacturing/Production, 3. Operations & Support (Sustainment),
and 4. Retirement (Disposal). Depots historically have performed
mostly the sustainment workload of a weapon system.
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B. FUNDAMENTALS OF DEPOT MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
1. Work Organization and Procedures
The three depots that provided most of the information
for this analysis (Sacramento, Letterkenny and Tobyhanna Army
Depots) are basically organized the same way. Figure 4 shows














* PP&C - PRODUCTION PLANNING &
CONTROL
Figure 4. Generic organizational chart for Army Depots.
Source: Developed by researcher.
The Maintenance Directorate is responsible for
performing all overhaul, fabrication and maintenance related
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operations for the depot. This includes the associated
functions of production planning and control, and special
projects. The various divisions under the Maintenance
Directorate comprise the particular specialization of each
depot.
Sacramento Army Depot (SAAD) , for instance,
specializes in communications -electronics items, complex laser
and optics systems, multilayered circuit card fabrication and
repair, fiber optics and cryogenic equipment. SAAD has the
capability to produce sophisticated radar systems such as the
Army's Firefinder Radar Kit. As such, SAAD has been
designated as the Center of Technical Excellence (CTX) for the
Firefinder Radar system.
The CTX Concept that DESCOM employs is a unique
management concept to ensure integration of the complete depot
industrial base in support of the total life cycle of weapon
systems. Depots are designated as CTXs to support certain
weapon systems that meet the following criteria:
• System is listed in the Army Modernization Information
Memorandum (AMIM)
• System is characterized by high complexity
• Weapon/Item has significant impact on depot system
• Support to materiel developer requires dedicated manager
• Logistic support factors have considerable impact upon
initial combat readiness of the system
• System will substantially impact fielded units
• System has high visibility at high levels of the Army
Personnel staffed in the CTX sections of depots
provide direct liaison with the acquisition program management
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offices during the development, production, and fielding of
the weapon system. Currently, eight depots are designated as
CTX for approximately 30 different weapon systems. However,
once the system has completed the development cycle and is
fielded, the standard depot maintenance commences and the CTX
designation is normally terminated.
When a customer work requirement is accepted by a
depot, it is assigned to the appropriate commodity division
which is responsible for the project planning, tracking and
reporting. This "prime shop, " as it is referred, identifies
all the individual tasks necessary to develop and/or to
produce and deliver the product. Workload planning is done
much in the same fashion as developing a Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) , covered in Chapter II. The prime shop
provides estimates of cost, start times, and completion times
for those tasks for which it is directly responsible. For
those tasks for that work from other functional elements of
other commodity divisions, e.g., engineering drawings,
welding, machining, painting, the PP&C division (Production
Planning and Control) accomplishes the necessary coordination.
PP&C division personnel are responsible for
coordinating and scheduling all tasks for each project. PP&C
personnel tabulate the tasks, associated costs, and schedules
for all depot functional elements necessary for each project.
Each task (or work package, as it is called with the WBS) is
assigned a Production Control Number (PCN) with associated
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dollar amounts based on the estimates received from the work
shops. Milestone charts and summary estimates of cost and
schedule are prepared and projections of cost over time are
presented in graphical form. As work proceeds on the work
packages, expended manhours are charged against the
appropriate PCN and by operational code, or "Op-code." Op-
codes identify the section or shop that is performing the work
being charged to the PCN. Use of op- codes and PCNs allows for
the intersection of the WBS and the depot's organizational
elements
.
Parts and materials drawn from inventory or the supply
division for each task are also charged against the PCN and
op- code. Work shops record daily expenditures of manhours and
materials per PCN into the automated information management
system called SIMA (System Integration and Management
Activity) . The PP&C division tracks all the PCNs of a certain
project to monitor progress. The PCNs of a project are
tracked to one Procurement Request Order Number (PRON) . The
summations of all the PCNs theoretically should add up to the
amount of the PRON, which represents the "baseline" for a
certain project. It is through the PRON that actual funds are
transferred from the customer to the depots.
Before work efforts are given to depots, there is a
form of negotiation that takes place. Potential customers
provide Statements of Work (SOW) and specifications to the
depot, which in turn prepares an initial estimate on cost and
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delivery schedule. Final details are worked out and once both
parties agree on the cost of the project, a MOA (Memorandum of
Agreement) locks the depot in on that price (normally a fixed-
price arrangement) . The funds are provided up front via the
PRON, materials are ordered and work can begin. Any overruns
on the project funds must be absorbed by the depot. In some
instances, however, customers actually provide the additional
funds for overruns. Since the depot and customers are both
Government activities, funds come from the same source.
Conversely, if the depot experiences an underrun, the funds
usually stay with the depot. DESCOM resource managers claim
that the overruns and underruns usually equal out over each
fiscal year.
The major customers of the depots are the Army's Major
Subordinate Commands (MSCs) , e.g., the Communication and
Electronics Command (CECOM) , Missile Command (MICOM) , and the
Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) . Other customers are from
the Army's Program Executive Offices, which control most of
the Army's Program Management Offices (PMO) . Program
management offices are often collocated with the MSCs. Most
single work projects accepted by depots average under $1
million; however, projects over $1 million are becoming more
common.
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2. Customer Cost and Schedule Reporting
Depot operations in the Depot System Command (DESCOM)
are basically uniform in procedure under the Standard Depot
System (SDS)
.
However, reporting to its customers in Program
Management Offices (PMO) is far from uniform. There are many
"program unique" reports that depot project leaders provide to
their corresponding PMO. The most common type of performance
report is the "Funds Status Report." This report provides
information on the total amount of funds received for a given
work effort, the amount expended and the total amount
remaining (also given in percentages)
,
provided monthly or
quarterly. An example of a typical Funds Status Report is
presented in Figure 5
.
Some Funds Status Reports go into detail on critical
material expenses and most are accompanied with a Gantt Chart
scheduling the planned start and completion dates of major
tasks for the project. However, these reports and charts
provide little indication of performance and
interrelationships of the work tasks on the charts. In
addition, the report provides no estimates of costs at
completion nor if the project will be completed on time.
For example, the information in Figure 5 shows that
approximately 54 percent of the funds are spent at the date of
the report, but it does not show if 54 percent of the work was
completed or not. Actually, the depot project leader was sure
that 54 percent of the work was not completed because much of
37
PROJECT "X" FUNDING STATUS
28 May 1992
PRON: 1J27 7 019 00H|1E
J0115L
AUTHORIZED FUNDS:
RECEIVED Dec 1991 $1,000,000













Switching Modules 2 8,800
Impedance Comparator 21,350
Peak Power Analyzer 15,000
RF HF Probe 1,900
Peak PWR Sensor 1,400




Figure 5. Typical project status report from Army Depots
to Customer Program Management Office. Source:
Sacramento Army Depot
.
the spent funds to date were for material on order and not in
process
.
As stated earlier, all information regarding
expenditures against PRONs via PCNs is input into the SIMA in
the depot workshops. SIMA is a part of the bigger network
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called the Standard Depot System (SDS) . All depots operate
under the SDS, which is more than just a computer network.
SDS is also a form of standard operating procedure for most
depot operations, including reporting procedures. SDS
provides guidance on shop management and also reporting
procedures. Most financial reporting from the depots is not
actual reporting in the historical sense. Rather, resource
management personnel from the depot and DESCOM are able to
access the SDS network and gather information they need to
generate their own reports. This process is very efficient
because it requires only that the functional elements of the
depot continuously input the resource data into the network.
Unnecessary paper is eliminated.
SDS utilizes electronic data interchange (EDI) with
depot headquarters, DESCOM in Letterkenny Army Depot,
Pennsylvania, for the purpose of resource management and
budgeting. At the same time, customers from the MSCs and PMOs
can also access the network for certain levels of information.
This process is actually another form of cost and schedule
reporting. Customers with access to the network can inquire
on the status of their projects via the "PRON" Report. An
example PRON report is shown in Figure 6.
A PRON report contains a wealth of information
concerning types of expenditures and the amount of funds
remaining. However, the only indicator on the report that
compares performance with funds spent is a line called "EQV-
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Figure 6. Example PRON Report (Procurement Request Order




PROD, " which stands for "equivalent -productions -units"
completed to date. The report is laden with codes, letters
and numbers, a sometimes confusing array of dollars, dates and
quantities. The PRON report in the hands of a upper level
manager, such as a Project Manager, would not be very useful
because it does not contain any variances, estimates at
completion or any other measures of effectiveness. Cost
analysts from the MSCs and program offices normally are the
ones who access the report and summarize expenditures and
funds remaining for providing information to the Project
Managers
.
In summary, the depot cost and schedule reporting to
program managers basically focuses on the expenditure of funds
without relating performance to these expenditures. There is
little standardization among reports to different programs,
creating what is known as "program unique" reports.
Some depot managers contend that PMs are kept up to
date on performance status of work efforts though quarterly
IPRs (In- Process Reviews) , which are normally conducted at the
depot site. However, IPRs rarely reveal efficiency rates or
cost/schedule trends that identify potential problems. In
addition, current depot reporting methods do not include
estimates of costs at completion of the work.
Estimates at completion (EAC) should concern the depot
more than the PM because of the fixed-price "contract"
commonly used within depots. The EACs and performance
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measurements, which are provided with the C/SSR, are vital in
view of today's declining budget in the Army. Depots are now
entering a new realm of what is called "acquisition work,
"
rather than just "sustainment work." Now, cost/schedule and
performance information is crucial to successful
implementation of a new weapon system. The number of depots
performing acquisition work is significantly increasing.
Examples of various acquisition work efforts currently at some
Army depots are provided in the following section.
C. SIGNIFICANT ACQUISITION EFFORTS AT ARMY DEPOTS
The mission of Army depots in recent years has been
expanding into many different areas of military support,
including acquisition work. Depots are now performing more
than just routine sustainment of weapon systems and are
becoming "partners" in the acquisition process of weapon
systems
.
Within the scope of this thesis, "acquisition efforts" are
defined as work outside the spectrum of a depot's "historical"
overhaul and sustainment work. The equipment and weapon
systems in the "historical" category have already been fielded
and are in the operations and support phase of their life
cycle. Conversely, an "acquisition effort" is restricted to
work performed in support of the development and/or production
phase of an equipment/weapon system. This can also include
major modifications of fielded weapon systems. An easy way to
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categorize significant acquisition efforts at Army depots is
by the type of funds used to pay for the efforts. Those
efforts that are funded with Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) category funds and Procurement category
funds are to be considered acquisition efforts. In addition,
an acquisition effort will also be managed by a program
management office, which is separate from the Major
Subordinate Commands. Most depot operations are funded with
the OMA (Operations and Maintenance Appropriation) category of
funds and are not managed by a PM. These are not considered
acquisition efforts.
A good example of a significant acquisition effort is the
M109A6 PALADIN Self - Propelled Howitzer program at Letterkenny
Army Depot (LEAD) . This program calls for upgrading and
modifying most of the older fleet of M109 chassis, many of
which were fielded over 20 years ago. Part of the program is
funded with OMA funds and the other with procurement funds,
but all funds are managed by the PALADIN Product Manager at
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. LEAD is working in conjunction
with BMY, Inc. (prime contractor) , for this program. The
initial work of stripping and cleaning the older howitzer
chassis is performed by LEAD and then the chassis are sent to
BMY in York, Pennsylvania. LEAD also assembles the
modification kits that will be installed by BMY. The total
estimated cost of the PALADIN work to be performed at LEAD is
$226.5 million for the period from FY 1992 to FY 1998.
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C/SCSC or the Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) is not
currently being used at LEAD for this work effort. In
addition, the depot project leaders of the PALADIN effort at
LEAD were not familiar with earned value or the C/SCSC since
it is not required. Although the PMO does receive the typical
monthly Fund Status Report from LEAD, they stated that it
would be much more helpful if they received a Cost Performance
Report (CPR) or the C/SSR. However, the PALADIN PMO personnel
are very pleased with the work that LEAD is doing and the PMO
does receive monthly CPRs from BMY.
Another example of a depot acquisition effort is the Air
Force managed joint program called JTIDS (Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System) currently ongoing at
Sacramento Army Depot (SAAD) . This is a development program
in which SAAD is developing 29 Test Program Sets for the
Integrated Family of Test Equipment (IFTE) . Currently, it has
been funded with RDT&E funds of $5.2 million for the period
from FY 1992 to 1994. Although the depot project leader said
that the formal earned value concept is not being used for
this effort at the depot, he did have a complete breakdown of
tasks and schedules for project control.
Several important acquisition efforts are also ongoing at
Tobyhanna Army Depot (TOAD) . One is the SINCGARS (Single
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System) and another is a
project in support of the Army Data Distribution System
(ADDS) . The depot project leader for the ADDS project was
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familiar with C/SCSC but indicated that they are not using it.
The depot managers provide the usual funds status reports with
cost breakdowns and milestones charts but no performance
variance analysis. Even though the Project Manager for the
ADDS is satisfied with the work of TOAD, he is not satisfied
with the funds status reports from TOAD. The ADDS PM strongly
supports the use of the C/SSR for the work at TOAD and
suggests that all Government field activities performing
"acquisition efforts" should implement the C/SSR. His program
has already successfully implemented the C/SSR for his testing
at the Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachucha, Arizona
[Ref . 36:p. 8]
.
During the research for this thesis, only one work effort
among the entire Depot System was found to be using the C/SSR
and the earned value concept. This was the Firefinder Radar
program at Sacramento Army Depot (SAAD) . This program, which
began in March 1992, marked the first time the earned value
concept was used within the DESCOM. The nearly $20 million,
three-year program called for the manufacture of 54 radar kits
and an associated program for the overhaul of five existing
radar kits. This work effort will be examined more closely in
Chapter IV of this thesis.
Today, there are numerous acquisition efforts ongoing at
most Army depots and the efforts will continue to grow in
numbers and in dollar value. Generally, when a depot has been
designated as a CTX (Center of Technical Excellence) for a
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certain weapon system, it will most likely be considered a
significant acquisition effort. Appendix B lists the current
locations and weapon systems of DESCOM's Centers of Technical
Excellence.
D. SUMMARY
DESCOM is a very large and complex military organization
with a long and proud history. As the mission of the depots
evolves with the changing role of today's Army, so must depot
operating procedures and management techniques. In the face
of direct competition with industry for a declining workload,
depots must explore new ways of doing business. In the
critical area of cost/schedule control and reporting, depots
should examine the methods that their competitors are using.
Industry has been using C/SCSC concepts for over 25 years and
its use is still growing. History has shown many management
techniques that have been proven successful in the commercial
sector become adopted for the Government's use. Supply
management and inventory procedures are two such examples
.
The next chapter further explores areas for Army depots to use
the concepts embodied in the C/SCSC.
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION OP EARNED VALUE TECHNIQUES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the procedures necessary for a
Program Manager (PM) to implement the earned value techniques
via the Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) with a private
contractor. The Cost/Schedule Management of Non-Major
Contracts (C/SSR Joint Guide) (Draft) provides excellent
guidelines for implementing the management techniques
necessary for the C/SSR [Ref. 9]. Though this Joint Guide
only focuses on implementing the C/SSR with private
contractors, the procedures are analyzed for their
applicability with Army depots. Only the C/SSR is analyzed
for its applicability with Army depots because it is unlikely
for a depot to receive a work effort above the thresholds
requiring a CPR.
A compatibility analysis follows that looks at how
compatible the standard depot operating systems would be with
meeting the requirements of the five categories of C/SCSC
criteria. Attention is focused on Sacramento Army Depot,
which was the first depot to implement the earned value
concept for a work effort (Firefinder, version seven Radar
program) . This chapter concludes with a summary of issues
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that Army depots must address before the concepts of C/SCSC
can be implemented.
B. PROCEDURES FOR C/SSR IMPLEMENTATION WITH A CONTRACTOR
1. Evaluation of Management Needs
The first step in C/SSR implementation should be an
assessment of the necessary information needed for
satisfactory control of a project. The PM must ensure that
the cost and schedule reporting requirements fit the
particular management needs. The extent of technical risk,
potential for cost growth and funding limitations are some
factors to be considered [Ref . 9:p. 2-1] . The PM must ensure
that implementing the C/SSR will contribute to successful
program management . The PM should evaluate if the
contractor's current methods of cost and schedule reporting
will meet the needs of the program.
2. Solicitation Clause
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
incorporates clauses for standardization of C/SSR requirements
throughout the DOD [Ref. 9:p. 2-1]. The C/SSR is a standard
data item (DI-F-6010) of the CDRL (Contract Data Requirements
List) . The solicitation document should, at a minimum,
stipulate: (1) the need for the contractor to have a written
summary of the management procedures for generating reliable
cost and schedule data for submission in the C/SSR; (2) a
preliminary Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) , and (3)
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provisions for access to pertinent internal documentation
[Ref . 9:p. 2-1]
.
3 . WBS Preparation
The PM should prepare a preliminary WBS to be included
in the solicitation. This summary level WBS identifies the
levels and elements for which cost and schedule performance
data will be reported and provides the framework for planning
and collecting contract -related information. The preliminary
WBS also helps the contractor in defining all the necessary
tasks to complete the project and in the preparation of the
detailed CWBS.
C/SSR reporting should be limited to level three or
higher of the CWBS [Ref. 9:p. 2]. The reporting level is of
critical importance because there is a significant increase in
the effort (and cost) to report at each successively lower WBS
level. In addition, a preliminary WBS is important because it
provides an opportunity for the contractor to expand on the
preliminary WBS to propose a better organization of work.
4 . Establishment of Reporting Requirements
Certain aspects of the C/SSR, such as the CWBS,
specific elements to be reported, reporting frequency, and the
initial submission date are normally negotiated between the
PMO and contractor. Most importantly, the performance
measurement approach must be agreed upon, in particular, the
method for determining the budgeted cost of work performed
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(BCWP) . The primary area of concern when measuring BCWP is
the measurement of the work- in- process, i.e., work packages
that have started, but are not completed as of the report cut-
off date [Ref . 9:p. 2-4] . This is important because the BCWP
provides a basis upon which to compare the variations from the
scheduled work, trends analyses, estimates at completion, and
progress payments.
5 . Plant Survey
The PM should visit the contractor to survey the
contractor's information management system and performance
measurement techniques. The contract should provide for
visits and discussions of the contractor's management
practices including appropriate briefings and demonstrations
of their cost/schedule information system. During the visit,
the PM and CAO (Contract Administration Office) should achieve
a basic understanding of the methods of planning and
scheduling work, controlling the resources applied to the
contract, measuring cost /schedule performance, authorizing
work and incorporating changes to the contract.
6. Software Support
A major reason why PERT/Cost and C/SCSC had such a
hard time catching on in the 1960s was due to inadequate
computer systems used during this period. C/SCSC techniques
require many computations and have a high degree of
input/output demands. The card punching and slow co-
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processors of the 1960 's technology were not conducive to
using C/SCSC. The use of the earned value techniques was
ahead of its time.
Today there is ample computer hardware and software
available to amplify the utility of the earned value
management tool, such as personal computers, local area
networks, electronic mail and electronic data interchange
(EDI) . There are also several software packages made just for
cost/schedule management and reporting. A recent evaluation
of the top four software programs concluded that the
"Performance Analyzer" software provided the best overall
utility for cost and schedule management [Ref 33 :p. 29].
Performance Analyzer (PA) is designed to improve the
efficiency of the analysis and reporting process associated
with CPRs and C/SSRs . The software generates reports that can
be sent to the PMO via EDI. Because of this efficient
transfer of information, the PMO and contractor can
communicate critical cost and schedule progress and can
converge on problem areas early on. Whatever the software
support, whether its PA or another comparable program, the PM
should provide this to the contractor for internal or external
use.
7 . Training Support
Training is a necessity for successful C/SSR
implementation if a contractor has never used the C/SSR. Even
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if a contractor has previously used the C/SSR (or CPR)
;
the PM
should still assess the contractor's level of competency with
C/SSR requirements. This can be done by reviewing past
contracts' performance and time since last using the C/SSR.
Training support can range from providing educational
materials and assistance visits, to formal classroom lectures.
However, the best training on C/SSR comes from experience, so
if necessary, the PM should provide periodic assistance
throughout the contract period.
8. Surveillance
The contract administration office is responsible to
ensure that the contractor is meeting his requirements and
that the C/SSR reflects actual conditions and addresses
actual/potential cost and schedule problems [Ref. 9:p. 2-11].
The authority for CAO surveillance is the contract, but the
basis of surveillance activities should be defined in a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the CAO and the PM. The
PM and the CAO should document and maintain the results of any
surveillance actions for future purposes.
At a minimum, surveillance actions should consist of
[Ref. 9:p. 2-11]
:
• Monitoring the progress of any corrective actions
previously required of the contractor.
• Receipt, analysis, and processing of the C/SSR to include
reconciliation of the C/SSR data to the contractor's
internal data.
• Ensuring that C/SSR clause provisions are complied with.
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• Monitoring the contract to assure the contractual
requirements and negotiated reporting requirements are
met
.
• Verifying that the contractor identifies and explains
significant changes to the budget plan and incorporates
changes in a timely manner.
• Verifying the reasons for and impact of the cost/schedule
variances on which they are required to report.
• Ensuring that the C/SSR data are reconcilable with data on
other reports.
In summary, the procedures listed above provide a
foundation for implementing the C/SSR at a contractor's
facility. However, the procedures to implement C/SSR are not
all inclusive and will vary among programs, depending on the
nature of the work required.
C. C/SSR COMPATIBILITY WITH THE STANDARD DEPOT SYSTEM
The following analysis addresses the compatibility of
current SDS procedures at three Army depots with the
requirements of the five major criteria categories of C/SCSC.
For this analysis three depots, Sacramento Army Depot (SAAD)
,
Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) , and Tobyhanna Army Depot (TOAD)
were used as a research base. Only three were chosen since
DESCOM stated that SDS basically operates the same for all
depots
.
Only the summarized requirements of the five categories of
C/SCSC, instead of the individual criteria, were used for the
analysis. This is because implementing the C/SSR does not
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require a formal Governmental validation of the criteria, as
does the CPR.
1. Organization Category
The ability to define the work effort and assign
responsibility for work is the requirement for the criteria in
the "organization" category. It was found that Army depots do
organize work in a fashion very similar to the Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) requirements listed in MIL-STD 881A. In
addition, Army depots have many skilled and experienced
managers able to define work efforts and assign
responsibility. All three depots analyzed for this thesis
would easily comply with this category of criteria.
Though the WBS is commonly used at Army depots, SAAD
experienced difficulties with the reporting levels for the
C/SSR. A depot manager for the Firefinder project commented
that the WBS reporting levels were not well defined, because
initially cost data were gathered and reported down to levels
four and five of the WBS. This created problems in having to
expend too much effort in gathering cost information on the
lower level packages. The normal reporting level for the
C/SSR is only to level three.
2 . Planning and Budgeting Category
The basic requirements for this category include the
ability to plan, schedule, budget, and authorize the work.
Depot project leaders, in conjunction with the PP&C
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(Production Planning & Control) division of the three depots
perform these tasks, except for budgeting , on a daily basis.
At LEAD and TOAD, the PP&C division prepares printouts
for each shop's scheduled work load for a 10 -week period,
which is updated weekly. This detailed report is called a
"Shop Completion Schedule, " and aids the shop managers in the
daily operations of their particular shops. Among the major
items included in the printout are work breakdowns by tasks
and op- codes, estimated total manhours for each task, incurred
manhours- to- date and remaining manhours- to- complete for each
task.
It is important to note that though the Shop
Completion Schedule assists a shop manager in authorizing work
efficiently, the report does not provide any cost information.
No material costs, indirect costs or direct labor costs are
included in the "shop" report. The Chief of the PP&C division
at LEAD stated that all depots basically use the Shop
Completion Schedule in the same way [Ref. 43]. Thus, depot
managers are usually not accustomed to establishing budgets
for individual work packages or cost accounts.
To be able to assign the budgets for C/SSR purposes,
depot managers need only to "dollarize" the individual work
packages into their cost accounts. To "dollarize" a work
package means to convert the estimated direct manhours and
material costs into a single total, in terms of dollars. The
depot project leaders of the Firefinder were able to
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accomplish the "dollarizing" to establish the Performance
Measurement Baseline (PMB) with only minimal training. The
assignment of budgets to individual work packages/cost
accounts is a change from the normal depot planning methods.
However, as the SAAD Director of Maintenance commented, this
would be a change for the better [Ref . 38] . Not only does the
assignment of budgets create a better sense of costs at all
levels, it requires more careful planning upfront, which
usually leads to greater efficiency throughout the course of
the project.
3 . Accounting Category
The accounting system of an organization must be able
to accumulate costs of work and material to satisfy the
requirements of the accounting category of C/SCSC criteria.
Each depot has an elaborate accounting system for tracking
expenditures per PRON (Procurement Request Order Number)
.
With regards to the C/SSR, however, the accounting system
(called "financial management system" in depots) is not linked
to the WBS (work breakdown structure) of a work effort. As a
result, the depot project leaders for the Firefinder project
had to estimate the actual cost of work performed (ACWP) for
some work packages/cost accounts.
Initially, their primary problem was estimating costs
of materials for open work packages. They overcame this by
using an overnight batch report that the SDS can generate if
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requested. The report is called "Parts Analysis Report,"
which shows the costs of material drawn from inventory per PCN
(Production Control Number) . The Firefinder project leaders
could cross reference these PCNs with the 'op- codes' to
estimate the costs of materials consumed by each open work
package [Ref . 39] . This method could be accomplished at each
of the three depots.
4. Analysis Category
Managers must be able to compare planned versus actual
costs and analyze the variances to meet the criteria
requirements of this category. Only with training and
experience in the area of earned value measurements can a
person become skilled in variance analysis. The SDS provided
scant information necessary to compare planned versus actual
costs for individual work packages.
Due to their inexperience in measuring earned value
(Budgeted Cost of Work Performed) , the depot managers of the
Firefinder project often equated the actual cost of work
performed (ACWP) to the planned or budgeted cost of work
performed (BCWP) , when, in fact, the actuals were
significantly different. As a result, there were no cost
variances in these cases indicated by the report, thus making
the report unreliable.
The analysis category of C/SCSC criteria requires an
appropriate amount of training to conduct proper variance
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analysis. The analyses of cost/schedule performance data are
where the "pay-offs," or the most benefits are received from
using the C/SSR. With proper and reliable data from a C/SSR,
a manager can identify signs of difficulties impacting from
technical, material, or personnel problems. The C/SSR also
provides work efficiency trends as early as the second or
third monthly report.
Note that the earned value concept embodied in the
C/SSR does not solve problems in and of itself. Rather, it
provides early indications of problems and potential problems
for management's attention. Currently, Army depot personnel
could not satisfy this category of criteria without a certain
amount of training and education. The software program
Performance Analyzer can greatly aid in the analysis of
planned versus actual expenditures. With C/SSR training and
using the Performance Analyzer, each depot analyzed could
easily provide reliable variance and trend analyses.
5. Revisions Category
This category of criteria requires an ability to
incorporate changes in the program and to be able to develop
estimates of final costs. Sacramento, Letterkenny and
Tobyhanna Army depots are accustomed to changes in the scope
-
of -work because of their relationship with their Government
customers. It is much easier for the Government to invoke a
change proposal at an Army depot than it is to invoke a change
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with a private contractor because of the contractual
difference. With a private contractor, a PM has to go through
the formal contract administration channels for a contract
modification. With a depot, a PM can just send a memo with an
adjustment of funds for the change. The point is, Army depot
managers are experienced at incorporating revisions to work
efforts
.
With regards to developing estimates of final costs,
all three depots fall short. Interviews of depot managers
revealed that depots do not normally provide estimates at
completion (EACs) unless the customer requests them. Even
then, the estimates of final costs are not based on
performance- to- date or indices of variances from the planned
work. Thus, providing there are no changes in the scope of
work, a depot estimate at completion usually does not change
from the initial estimate.
One point of view may contend that revising EACs is
not necessary because the work effort is a firm fixed-price
"contract". On the other hand, with a firm fixed-price
arrangement, the depot leadership should be more concerned
with estimates at completion (EAC) because it is the depot
that will absorb all cost overruns.
Additionally, in view of today's tighter budgets, both
the depot and customer should be concerned with EACs to ensure
that all forecasted costs are budgeted for. The program
manager, as a customer of an Army depot, has to be concerned
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with estimated final costs because a significant increase from
the initial estimate invariably results in a later delivery
schedule. This is one of several reasons why all the program
office personnel interviewed for this thesis would prefer that
the three depots use the C/SSR for their programs. By using
the C/SSR, current estimates at completion (EAC) are provided
monthly.
Interviews with depot personnel and DESCOM
Headquarters indicate that depot managers do not emphasize
cost or schedule trends, variance analysis or EACs . This
finding parallels a 1983 Presidential private sector survey on
cost control which concluded that "there appears to be
insufficient emphasis on cost trending and forecasting. As a
result, when overruns are identified it is often too late to
take corrective measures [Ref 37] .
"
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF C/SSR AT SACRAMENTO ARMY DEPOT
The Special Projects Division, SAAD, became the first
DESCOM depot to implement the C/SSR and thus use the earned
value concept. SAAD had been the Center of Technical
Excellence (CTX) designate for the Firefinder Project
(formerly under the Radar Program) , Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
The Radar PMO released a Request For Proposal (RFP) for full
and open competition requiring the manufacture of 54 AN/TPQ-3 6
Firefinder radar kits and the overhaul of five older version
models. The Special Projects Division of SAAD and Hughes
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Aircraft (the original manufacturer) submitted proposals for
the work. The solicitation document included the standard
C/SSR clause, among the other standard items normally found in
RFPs for open competition among private industry. The
contracting officer for the PMO determined that SAAD offered
the best value and thus awarded the contract to SAAD in March
1992. It was a firm fixed-price "contract", with an estimated
total cost of $16.7 million over a three-year period.
According to DODI 5000. 2M, section 20, a firm fixed-price
contract does not require a CPR or C/SSR unless the program
manager determines it necessary for cost/schedule visibility.
In this case and against the wishes of the depot leadership,
the PM insisted that the depot provide a C/SSR on a monthly
basis [Ref . 42] . An Interdepartmental MOA was signed in March
1992, marking the beginning of the implementation of the
earned value concept at SAAD.
Only one or two depot managers were familiar with C/SCSC
and the earned value concept when work started on the
Firefinder project. As a result, problems developed almost
immediately, primarily with establishment of the Performance
Measurement Baseline (PMB) (defining, scheduling, and
budgeting work packages) . Depot managers were accustomed to
defining, scheduling, and estimating the total manhour and
material requirements for projects, but were not accustomed to
assigning budgets (in dollars) to each work package.
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The Director of Maintenance at SAAD indicated that the
planning aspect of C/SSR was one of many positive aspects
about the C/SSR concept. According to this official:
It requires our first line managers to think and measure
everything in terms of dollars. Just being aware of the
dollar cost of work instead of thinking in terms of
manhours will help us become more competitive. This frame
of mind probably will be one of the earlier obstacles we
must hurdle [Ref. 38]
The Radar program office sent experienced program analysts
to the depot to assist and train depot personnel on C/SCSC
concepts and C/SSR procedures . The program analysts were
confident that the depot could provide the C/SSRs with minimal
changes from their current operating and management systems.
This pioneering effort by the Special Projects Division called
attention to itself from the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller). In April 1992, a representative
from the Comptroller's office came to the depot to assist in
the training effort.
It was not until June 1992 that the Special Projects
Division first received the PA software from the Firefinder
project office. The software program enabled the depot to
submit its first C/SSR, which was sent via the Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) . The depot managers said that the
information for the C/SSR was much easier to manage using the
PA program.
The pioneering implementation of the C/SSR at SAAD would
have been an ideal test case for examination of the long term
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feasibility of using C/SCSC concepts at all Army depots.
Unfortunately, due to implications of the closing of
Sacramento Army Depot 3
,
work on the Firefinder project slowed
down and was eventually transferred to Tobyhanna Army Depot
(TOAD) in November 1992. A decision to continue the C/SSR
requirement at TOAD has not been made as of February 1993
.
A significant problem encountered with the impending
closure of SAAD was the loss of trained personnel. The
managers who were most knowledgeable with the project,
received the C/SCSC training, and set up the initial baseline,
left the depot without being able to sufficiently train their
successors. As a result, project control of C/SSR data
deteriorated. The method of measuring the BCWP (budgeted cost
of work performed) was of critical importance, and no one
totally understood what method was being used.
Certain fundamentals of implementing the C/SSR at Army
depots and the compatibility of the Standard Depot System
(SDS) were nonetheless brought out during the short attempt at
SAAD. Fundamentals such as training and education, the
accounting system link to the WBS of a project, and certain
issues involved with incorporating a new procedure within an
organization can be noted as lessons learned.
The absence of a link between the financial management
system of SDS and the WBS should be further addressed. This
3Sacramento Army Depot is scheduled to close in January 1994
under the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) of 1991.
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affects the computations of actual direct labor costs for
C/SSR purposes. The WBS reporting level for the Firefinder
project was at level three, which in the organizational
structure was the sub-PCN level. The financial management
system of SDS only provided cost visibility to the PCN level.
This caused the depot project managers to manually tabulate
labor costs of each sub-PCN. The information to do the
tabulating was not difficult to obtain but it was sometimes
time consuming. The Chief of the Automation Division at SAAD
stated that it would only require minor modifications to the
SDS to provide cost visibility down to the sub-PCN level [Ref
.
40] .
DESCOM currently has a SDS Modernization Program ongoing
that may provide managers the ability to query the SDS and
tailor their own reports. To improve the utility of the
C/SSR, DESCOM should include upgrades to the SDS that can
provide cost visibility to the sub-PCN level. However, using
the C/SSR, a depot would be afforded the flexibility of
improving their own internal control methods to generate the
necessary information.
E. ANALYSIS OF C/SSR IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES AT ARMY DEPOTS
The same eight procedures to implement the C/SSR at a
private contractor were analyzed with respect to their
applicability to Army depots. When "contracting" with an Army
depot, a PM may use a less formal approach than with a private
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contractor. Nonetheless, a PM' s concern for effective cost
and schedule control should be one of his highest management
priorities. For review, the eight procedures are:
• Management Need Evaluation
• Solicitation Clause
• WBS Preparation





1. Management Need Evaluation
The evaluation of management needs should be an
automatic task regardless of whether the contract involves a
private firm or an Army depot. The PM will have to consider
his program's technical risk, potential for cost growth, and
funding limitations, just as he would if contracting with a
private firm. In addition, when "contracting" with an Army
depot, the PM should also consider the possibility of follow
on support from the depot. By investing today in the
implementation of the C/SSR at the depot, future support
programs also will benefit. Thus, the management need




Army depots would have difficulty responding to a
solicitation that required written procedures for generating
reliable cost/schedule data for the C/SSR. This is because
depots have never used the C/SSR and do not have personnel
familiar with the requirements of the C/SSR. However, by
working with the PMO and contracting officers, depot managers
could prepare bid responses that relate to the requirements of
the data necessary for C/SSRs. Most depots already have the
capability with their present information systems to generate
the necessary data for C/SSRs, and only need to restructure
the data into proper format and organization. The
requirements for C/SSR and the training for its use could be
a part of the "contract" or MOA negotiations.
3 . WBS Preparation
With regards to the next procedure, PM preparation of
a preliminary WBS, would also apply to Army depots. This is
because a preliminary WBS is a common sense approach to
successful initiation of any work effort, regardless if the
C/SSR is used or not. A summary level WBS clearly
communicates the basic requirements of the work effort and
identifies the elements for which cost and schedule
performance data will be reported. The preliminary WBS also
helps the depot in defining all the necessary tasks to
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complete the project and in the preparation of the detailed
CWBS.
The reporting level is of critical importance because
there is a significant increase in the effort (and cost) to
report at each successively lower WBS level. Therefore, C/SSR
reporting should be limited to level three or higher of the
CWBS [Ref . 9:p. 2] . The depots visited for this research were
familiar with, and usually organized their work efforts under
the guidelines of MIL-STD 881A (Work Breakdown Structure
Manual)
.
4. Establishment of Reporting Requirements
If the evaluation of the management needs (step one)
determined that the C/SSR is required, certain elements of the
report should be included in the "contract". Items such as
the CWBS and reporting level, reporting frequency, initial
submission date, and the performance measurement approach
should be the major considerations. Many of these reporting
requirements that should be established are the same as if
implementing the C/SSR at a contractor and for the same
reasons. Exact guidelines cannot be provided because
reporting requirements will vary according to "contract" value
and content. For example, a work effort in the $80 to $100
million range requires more management attention than a
contract for $5 million. Similarly, a project with low risk
will demand less attention than a project involving a high
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technical risk. Thus, the PM should base the reporting
requirements on his evaluation of management needs.
5. Plant Survey
A visit to the Army depot is an important step for a
PM for several reasons . One reason is that the PM can survey
the depot's information management system, performance
measurement techniques and his project's relative priority
among the total depot workload. Other reasons are that it
allows the depot personnel to meet the PM face- to- face, and
the PM can observe the capabilities of the depot. Therefore,
a plant survey should be accomplished if implementing the
C/SSR at a depot.
6. Software Support
Most Army depots are automated under the Standard
Depot System (SDS) and are linked to the locations of most
Army program offices. Thus, installing software programs that
aid in compiling C/SSR data, such as Performance Analyzer (PA)
would be a nominal task and should be done. However, an
appropriate amount of training with the software program would
be required to ensure proper implementation and use of the
C/SSR. The Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) , Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, can provide assistance in the use and




As noted with the C/SSR implementation with a
contractor, training of depot personnel is also vital when
using the C/SSR. Besides the assistance visits and briefings
a PM can provide Army depot personnel , there are other
alternatives available. The Defense Systems Management
College also offers many types of correspondence courses in
the area of Earned Value and C/SCSC.
The main point of this procedure is that training is
critical when using the C/SSR. Without upfront training, the
implementation process will most likely fail or require an
extended period before the benefits of the C/SSR are realized.
8. Surveillance
Many of the same surveillance actions recommended for
a PM implementing the C/SSR with a contractor also apply when
"contracting" with an Army depot. Critical C/SSR surveillance
actions at an Army depot include:
• Monitoring the progress of any corrective actions
previously required of the depot.
• Verifying that the depot identifies and explains
significant changes to the budget plan and incorporates
changes in a timely manner.
• Verifying the reasons for and impact of the cost/schedule
variances on which they are required to report
.
• Receipt, analysis, and processing of the C/SSR to include
reconciliation of the C/SSR data to the contractor's
internal data.
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In addition, a PM should require the depot to report any-
significant changes to internal operating procedures that may-
affect C/SSR reporting.
F. OTHER ISSUES INVOLVED WITH IMPLEMENTING THE C/SSR AT ARMY
DEPOTS
Two other significant issues should be addressed before
implementing earned value techniques in Army depots. These
are resistance to change and top level support.
1. Resistance to Change
Change in an organization has always been a delicate
undertaking and is a subject that has been thoroughly studied.
However, using earned value techniques and the C/SSR in depots
may not be such a radical change. Theoretically, using the
earned value concept is only a formal enumeration of certain
basic principles of good management.
Education and training play a big role in the change
process. All personnel involved with the C/SSR should attend
training to become acquainted with the criteria, implementing
procedures and the benefits of its use. Once the C/SSR is in
place and used routinely, the benefits normally outweigh any
training costs [Ref. 27:p. 68]. In addition, once an
organization's management information system has been approved
for using C/SSR, it usually does not need to be reevaluated.
It should be noted that SAAD personnel received training on
C/SCSC concepts, but only after work was underway. Ideally,
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the training should have been conducted prior to the actual
start of work.
It takes a significant amount of time for a change to
take hold inside an organization. Many problems SAAD
experienced may not occur at other depots because of the
unique effects of the impending closure of the depot had on
its operations. SAAD did not actually have enough time to
work the C/SSR into its normal operating procedures. It
should be noted that some companies can take several years to
incorporate the earned value concept. The Communication
Systems Division of Hughes Aircraft took over five years to
overcome resistance to change before fully implementing the
C/SCSC concepts [Ref 41] . Today the Communication Systems
Division uses C/SCSC techniques for all work projects, even if
it is not required by contract.
2 . Top Level Support
SAAD's implementation of C/SSR did not originate from
the command level of the depot as a new depot reporting
procedure. Instead, using the C/SSR was resisted by top
management until it was finally decided that the C/SSR would
be used. The depot mid- level managers had to spearhead this
"new" cost and schedule control technique without initial
command support. Critical to any successful implementation of
a change is top level involvement and commitment.
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G. SUMMARY
The Program Manager procedures for C/SSR implementation at
an Army depot are basically the same as for C/SSR
implementation at a private contractor's facility. The
differences are only the degree of formality involved in
contract implementation. However, Army depots may require
additional training support from the program office because of
the "resistance to change" issue mentioned above.
Analysis of the compatibility of the SDS with the five
categories of C/SCSC indicated that the three Standard Depot
Systems (SDS) are currently only compatible in the
organization and revisions categories. However, with manager
training and some experience with the concepts of C/SCSC,
depots can also meet the requirements of the planning and
budgeting, and analysis criteria categories.
For the SDS to be compatible with the accounting category
of criteria, a link from the financial management system to a
project's WBS would have to be developed. The flexibility of
the C/SSR should allow the organization to improvise, using
existing procedures to generate the required information. The
depot managers of SAAD's Firefinder project demonstrated this
by adapting the available information from the SDS to gather
needed cost information.
The C/SSR implementation at SAAD also revealed several
important points. The main point is that the C/SSR can be
implemented in Army depots without major modifications to
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their current automation systems or operating procedures.
However, to make it less of an administrative burden to
compile cost data, minor modifications that link the
accounting system to a project's WBS would be required.
Specifically, labor and material cost visibility down to the
sub-PCN level should be available from the SDS user terminals
for the depot project leaders.
Another critical issue associated with SAAD's experience
with the C/SSR is that it demonstrated how important training
and education is when incorporating a change. The Firefinder
project leaders of SAAD had many difficulties in establishing
a performance measurement baseline. Many of these problems
may have been alleviated had training on C/SCSC concepts begun
earlier.
As noted from the three depots researched, DESCOM must
address the issues of resistance to change and top level
support before a decision to implement the C/SSR is made. For
an Army depot to use the C/SSR effectively, commitment and
support, from DESCOM Headquarters to the depot leadership,
will be the key to success.
73
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. General Conclusions
As a result of this thesis research it is concluded
that U.S. Army depots should use the C/SCSC concepts when
performing significant acquisition efforts. The primary
reason for implementation of C/SCSC techniques at Army depots
is for improvement in controlling the cost and schedule of
acquisition programs. There are also two other significant
benefits of using the earned value concept at U.S. Army
depots
:
• C/SCSC techniques aid in program control, provide early
identification of problems, and help to minimize schedule
slippages and cost overruns.
• The reports generated from the C/SCSC techniques provide
reliable information on cost and schedule status to the
customer for decision making purposes.
As the amount of work at Army depots is being reduced
due to military cutbacks, competition with industry has
increased. To be competitive, Army depots must catch up with
industry in not only modernization of equipment and
facilities, but also with management techniques. Though Army
depots have Strategic Modernization Plans for upgrading their
facilities and equipment, they also must attempt to keep pace
with industry in the area of management and cost control . The
74
defense industry has already been using C/SCSC concepts for
over 25 years.
2. Specific Conclusions
The following is a summary of specific conclusions
determined from the research and analysis of this thesis:
a. Army Depots Should Use The C/SSR For Most Of Their
Acquisition Efforts.
The C/SSR is more flexible and less extensive than
the CPR and is more suitable to Army depot operations. The
CPR requires that the budgeted cost of work scheduled (BCWS)
and the budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP) be calculated
as a direct summation of work package budgets. The C/SSR,
however, permits the determination of the BCWS and BCWP
through any reasonably accurate, consistent, and mutually
agreed to means. The flexibility of the C/SSR eases the
problem of the depot's financial management system not linking
with the WBS by being able to estimate some portions of the
totals
.
Another reason why Army depots should use the C/SSR
is that most acquisition efforts performed by depots are under
the thresholds for using the CPR. The recommended lower
thresholds for using the C/SSR are for efforts over 12 months
in duration and over $2 million, which more closely resemble
the costs of many depots work efforts.
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Jb. The Cost/Schedule Performance Reports that Depots
Provide to Customers are Deficient in Satisfying
Management Needs
This conclusion is based on interviews with Program
Management personnel, and from analyzing the current depot
cost/schedule reporting methods of the three depots (SAAD,
TOAD and LEAD) . Depot Fund Status Reports typically show only
program funds spent and funds remaining. No comparisons of
planned versus actual spending, performance analysis, nor any
indications of estimates of final costs were provided from the
depot reports. Implementation of the C/SSR would provide the
PM all this information monthly, including the ability to
identify problem and potential problem areas.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that DESCOM (Depot System Command)
incrementally integrate the use of the Cost/Schedule Status
Report (C/SSR) into the Standard Depot System (SDS) of depot
operating procedures. C/SSR implementation should be accepted
and promoted by the top depot leadership and supported down to
shop manager level. Education and training is the key to a
successful implementation of any type of change. The
following list summarizes the major recommendations of this
research:
• Depots performing acquisition work should use the C/SSR as
a standard report for all work efforts estimated to last
over 12 months in duration and over $2 million.
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• DESCOM should include in their modernization of the SDS
,
provisions to link the financial management system with
the Work Breakdown Structure of the depot acquisition
projects.
• Depots should incorporate the Performance Analyzer
software (or comparable) to aid in using the C/SSR.
• DESCOM should invest in team education and training
programs on C/SCSC and the C/SSR at all depots involved
with acquisition type work. The Performance Management
Division of the Army Materiel Command Headquarters and the
Defense Systems Management College can provide assistance
in this area.
C. RECOMMENDED AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH
Areas recommended for future research include exploring
the feasibility of using C/SCSC concepts at other DOD field
activities involved with acquisition efforts. In particular,
Navy and Air Force depots should be researched.
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APPENDIX A. COST/SCHEDULE CONTROL SYSTEMS CRITERIA
The following delineates the 35 criteria of C/SCSC, as listed




a. Define all authorized work and related
resources to meet the requirements of the
contract, using the contract work breakdown
structure (WBS)
.
b. Identify the internal organizational elements
and the major subcontractors responsible for
accomplishing the authorized work.
c. Provide for the integration of the
contractor' s planning, scheduling, budgeting,
work authorization and cost accumulation
systems with each other, the contract work
breakdown structure, and the organizational
structure.
d. Identify the managerial positions responsible
for controlling overhead (indirect costs)
.
e. Provide for integration of the contract work
breakdown structure in a manner that permits
cost and schedule performance measurement for
contract work breakdown structure and
organizational elements.
2 Planning and Budgeting
a. Schedule the authorized work in a manner
which describes the sequence of work and
identifies the significant task
interdependencies required to meet the
development, production, and delivery
requirements of the contract
.
b. Identify physical products, milestones,
technical performance goals, or other




c. Establish and maintain a time-phased budget
baseline at the cost account level against
which contract performance can be measured.
Initial budgets established for this purpose
will be based on the negotiated target cost.
Any other amount used for performance
measurement purposes must be formally
recognized by both the contractor and the
Government
.
d. Establish budgets for all authorized work
with separate identification of cost elements
(labor, material, etc.).
e. To the extent the authorized work can be
identified in discrete, short span work
packages, establish budgets for this work in
terms of dollars, hours, or other measurable
units. Where the entire cost account can not
be subdivided into detailed work packages,
identify far term effort in larger planning
packages for budget and scheduling purposes.
f. Provide that the sum of all work package
budgets, plus planning package budgets within
a cost account equals the cost account
budget
.
g. Identify relationships of budgets or
standards in work authorization systems to
budgets for work packages
.
h. Identify and control level -of -effort activity
by time-phased budgets established for this
purpose. Only that effort which cannot be
identified as discrete, short span work
packages or as apportioned effort may be
classed as level-of -effort
.
i. Establish overhead budgets for the total
costs of each significant organizational
component whose expenses will become indirect
costs. Reflect in the contract budgets at
the appropriate level the amounts in overhead
pools that are planned to be allocated to the
contract as indirect costs.




k. Provide that the contract target cost plus
the estimated cost of authorized but unpriced
work is reconciled with the sum of all




a. Record direct costs on an applied or other
acceptable basis in a manner consistent with
the budgets in a formal system that is
controlled by the general books of account,
b. Summarize direct costs from cost accounts
into the work breakdown structure without
allocation of a single cost account to two or
more work breakdown structure elements.
c. Summarize direct cost from the cost accounts
into the contractor's functional
organizational elements without allocation of
a single cost account to two or more
organizational elements.
d. Record all indirect costs which will be
allocated to the contract.
e. Identify the bases for allocating the cost of
apportioned effort.
f. Identify unit costs, equivalent unit costs,
or lot costs as applicable.
g. The contractor's material accounting system
will provide for:
(1) Accurate cost accumulation and
assignment of costs to cost
accounts in a manner consistent




(2) Determination of price
variances by comparing planned
versus actual commitments.
(3) Cost performance measurement at
the point in time most suitable
for the category of material
involved, but no earlier than
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the time of actual receipt of
material
.
(4) Determination of cost variances
attributable to the excess
usage of material
.
(5) Determination of unit or lot
costs when applicable.
(6) Full accountability for all




a. Identify at the cost account level on a
monthly basis using data from, or
reconcilable with, the accounting system:
(1) Comparison of budgeted cost for
work scheduled and budgeted
cost of work performed;
(2) Comparison of budgeted cost for
work performed and actual
(applied where appropriate)
direct costs for the same work;
and
(3) Variances resulting from the
comparisons between the
budgeted cost for work
scheduled and the budgeted cost
for work performed and between
the budgeted cost for work
performed and actual or applied
direct costs, classified in
terms of labor, material, or
other appropriate elements
together with the reasons for
significant variances.
b. Identify on a monthly basis, in the detail
needed by management for effective control,
budgeted indirect costs, actual indirect
costs, and cost variances with the reasons
for significant variances.
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c. Summarize the data elements and associated
variances listed in subparagraphs 4. a. (1) and
(2) , above, through the contractor
organization and work breakdown structure to
the reporting level specified in the
contract
.
d. Identify significant differences on a monthly
basis between planned and actual schedule
accomplishment and the reasons.
e. Identify managerial actions taken as a result
of criteria items in paragraphs 4. a. through
4 . d . , above
.
f. Based on performance to date, on commitment
values for material, and on estimates of
future conditions, develop revised estimates
of cost at completion for work breakdown
structure elements identified in the contract
and compare these with the contract budget
base and the latest statement of funds
requirements reported to the Government.
Revisions and Access to Data
a. Incorporate contractual changes
expeditiously, recording the effects of such
changes in budgets and schedule. In the
directed effort prior to negotiations of a
change, base such revisions on the amount
estimated an budgeted to the functional
organizations
.
b. Reconcile original budgets for those elements
of the work breakdown structure identified as
priced line items in the contract, and for
those elements at the lowest level in the
program work breakdown structure, with
current performance measurement budgets in
terms of changes to the authorized work and
internal replanning in the detail needed by
management for effective control.
c. Prohibit retroactive changes to records pertaining to
work performed that would change previously reported
amounts for direct costs, indirect costs, or budgets,
except for correction of errors and routine accounting
adjustments
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d. Prevent revisions to the contract budget base
except for Government directed changes to
contractual effort.
e. Document internally the changes to
performance measurement baseline and notify
expeditiously the procuring activity through
prescribed procedures.
f. Provide the Contracting Officer and the
Contracting Officer's authorized
representatives with access to the
information and supporting documentation
necessary to demonstrate compliance with the
cost/schedule control systems criteria.
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APPENDIX B. DEPOT CENTERS OF TECHNICAL EXCELLENCE
DESIGNATIONS
Anniston Army Depot
• M1/M1A1 Abrams Tank
• Hellfire Missile System
• Army Tactical Missile System
Corpus Christi Army Depot
• AH- 64 Apache
• UH-60 Blackhawk
• Light Helicopter Airframe and Power Train (LHX)
Letterkenny Army Depot
• Howitzer Improvement Program: M109 Howitzer (Paladin)
• Patriot Missile System
• Hawk Missile System
Lexington -Blue Grass Army Depot
• COMSEC Equipment
• Fiber-Optic Guided Missile
Red River Army Depot
• Bradley Fighting Vehicle System: M2/M3
• FISTV V: M981 Fire Support Team Vehicle
Sacramento Army Depot
• Guardrail V
• Firefinder Radar Kit: AN/TPQ- 36/37
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• Light Helicopter and Avionics (LHX)
Tobyhanna Army Depot
• SINCGARS Regency Net
• AN/TTC-39, TYC-39, and DGM
• Integrated Family of Test Equipment
• DSCS
• Joint Stars, ASA/ENSCE
• Space Communications
Tooele Army Depot
• Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT)
• Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE)
• High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
• Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)
• M939 Trucks
• Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS)
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